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‘Punctuality’ and Verb Semantics
Stefan Engelberg
1  Introduction
Whether verbs have to be marked as punctual vs. durative has been a contro-
versial issue from the very beginnings of research on aktionsarten in the last
century right on up to modern theories of aspectual classes and aspect com-
position. Debates about the linguistic necessity of this distinction have often
been accompanied by the question of what it means for a verb to be
temporally punctual.
In this paper I will, firstly, sketch the history of research on the punctual-
durative distinction and present several linguistic arguments in its favor.
Secondly, I will show how this distinction is captured in an event-structure-
based approach to lexical semantics. Thirdly, I will discuss the extent to
which a precise definition of the notions used in lexical representations helps
avoid circular argumentation in lexical semantics. Finally, I will demonstrate
how this can be done for the notion of ‘punctuality’ by clarifying the logical
type of this predicate and relating it to central cognitive time concepts.
2  Evidence for Punctuality in the Lexicon
The notions of ‘punctuality’ and ‘durativity’ have been extensively employed
in research on aspectuality, i.e., research on grammatical aspect, aktionsarten,
Vendler classes and the like. Among the earliest approaches to these
phenomena are theories on grammatical aspect, in particular the distinction
between the classical Greek aorist stem and present stem and on the aspect
system in Slavic languages. The perfective aspect in Greek and Slavic has
often been described as ‘punctual’, the imperfective aspect as ‘durative’ (e.g.
Schleicher 1855, Pott 1859, Curtius 1863). This approach has not proven
very fruitful but it should be kept in mind that until the early twentieth
century a distinction between grammatical aspect and lexical phenomena like
aktionsart had not been made.1
                                                          
1Aspect is nowadays usually understood to be a grammatical category alongside
others such as tense, mode, etc., which is paradigmatically applied to verb forms by
means of inflection, derivation or stem formation, while aktionsart is taken to be a
Little by little, phenomena more closely related to the lexical meaning of
verbs entered into linguistic discussion.2 Observations concerning the
distribution of adverbials denoting a span of time go as far back as Romberg
(1899). These adverbials (e.g., in two hours) usually combine with verbs
denoting durative events with a result state (1)3. If combined with punctual
change of state verbs they often sound odd (2), unless a preceding event can
either be anchored in context as a reference point for the beginning of the
interval (3), or is lexically presupposed. In (4), for example, it is presupposed
that Rebecca had been moving towards the summit:
(1) Rebecca wrote the paper in six weeks
(2) ??Rebecca’s vase broke in two minutes
(3) Rebecca pressed the button and the bomb exploded in two minutes
(4) Rebecca reached the summit in two hours
Two things should be noticed: Firstly, even if the interval denoted by the
in-phrase is very short, the beginning of the interval seems to be anchored in
some contextually salient event when the phrase is combined with a punctual
verb. In (3) the beginning of the interval is the event when Rebecca pressed
the button; the sentence is not interpreted in the sense that the explosion itself
took three seconds. This is reflected by the fact that in these cases the in-
phrase can be replaced by a PP headed by after (cf. Piñon 1997): (3) is
equivalent to (5) but (1) is not equivalent to (6).
(5) Rebecca pressed the button and the bomb exploded after two minutes
(6) Rebecca wrote the paper after six weeks
Secondly, punctual verbs that presuppose a preceding durative event are
characterized by the fact that punctual adverbials unambigously refer to the
end of the event as in (7) while this is not the case with normal accomplish-
                                                                                                                           
lexical category derived from the lexical meaning of verbs and which - if it is related
to specific morphemes at all - is expressed mainly by derivational affixes. The
mingling of aspect and aktionsart phenomena in the last century was partly due to the
emphasis that was put on the investigation of Gothic, where the morphem ga-
reached a certain degree of grammaticalization as a prefix expressing perfectivity.
2Cf. Engelberg (1998:64ff) for a more detailed discussion of these phenomena.
3As is well known this does not hold if a bare plural or a mass noun occurs in
object position: ??she wrote papers / stuff in two weeks.
ment verbs (i.e., verbs in which a durative event leading to a change of state
is implied by the meaning of the verb) as can be seen in (8): If the verb is in
the future tense, the adverbial always refers to the beginning of the whole
event, and if it is in the past tense, it is likely to do so.
(7) Rebecca won / will win the race at five
(8) Rebecca cleaned up / will clean up her room at five
Durative adverbials have been used as a diagnostics for verbs semantics
since Romberg (1899) and Streitberg (1900). These adverbials (e.g., for two
hours) usually combine with non-resultative durative verbs (9). They may
also combine with non-resultative punctual verbs, in which case the verbs
receive an iterative interpretation as in (10). This even seems to hold when
the temporal adverbial denotes an extremely short period of time (11):
(9) Rebecca jogged / was jogging for a couple of minutes
(10)Rebecca hit / was hitting him for a couple of minutes (→ repeatedly)
(11)Rebecca hopped / was hopping for two seconds (→ repeatedly)
Streitberg (1900) also noticed that punctual verbs do not occur as
complements of aspectual verbs like beginnen ‘to start’ or aufhören ‘to stop’
as in (12). Again, this is possible if they can get an iterative interpretation as
in (13), which is usually available for non-resultative punctual verbs:
(12)*The vase started / stopped breaking
(13)Jamaal started / stopped hopping (→ repeatedly)
Another long standing puzzle has been the question why some verbs
cannot occur in the progressive aspect. Leaving aside restrictions on stative
verbs for the moment, an approximate solution might be the following: While
all durative verbs allow the progressive form, for punctual verbs there are
occurrence and interpretation restrictions. Firstly, such restrictions include
that non-resultative punctual verbs are interpreted iteratively when they occur
in the progressive (14). Secondly, punctual verbs that presuppose a preceding
event occur in the progressive, as in (15), where it is presupposed that
Rebecca participated in the race or was nearing the completion of her
journey. In this case, the progressive sentence is related to the time of this
preceding event. Finally, punctual verbs that do not belong to these two types
- especially those that lead to cognitive states - do not allow the progressive
(16) (Engelberg 1998:74ff).
(14)Rebecca was pinching Jamaal / was hopping (→ repeatedly)
(15)Rebecca was winning the race / was arriving
(16) ??Rebecca was noticing that / ??that was astonishing Rebecca
Other phenomena related to punctuality concern syntactic structures.
Among these is a valence alternation between an accusative object and a PP
headed by an. This alternation is restricted to verbs that refer to events that i)
are non-punctual and ii) are followed by a result state; i.e., it is restricted to
durative verbs (DUR) verbs that express a change of state (CS) like
schreiben ‘to write’, bauen ‘to build’, nähen ‘to sew’, in contrast to punctual
verbs (PCT) like sprengen ‘to blast, to blow up’, brechen ‘to break’, knicken
‘to fold’ (Engelberg 1994):
(17)Rebecca baute eine Hundehütte / an einer Hundehütte [DUR; CS]
approx.: ‘she built / was building a doghouse’
(literally: “she built a doghouse / at a doghouse”)
(18)Rebecca streichelte ihre Katze / *an ihrer Katze [DUR]
‘she petted / was petting her cat’
(19)Rebecca sprengte die Brücke / *an der Brücke [PCT; CS]
‘she blew up / was blowing up the bridge’
(20)Rebecca schlug ihren Freund / *an ihrem Freund[PCT]
‘she hit / was hitting her friend’
Finally, according to Oya (1996), punctuality is among the conditions
that determine the occurrence of the expletive reflexive pronoun sich with
those intransitive verbs that take part in the causative-inchoative alternation
in German. Verbs that do not occur with the reflexive pronoun are those that
refer to punctual events (zersplittern ‘to shatter’, zerbrechen ‘to break’,
abreißen ‘to tear off’), events that originate naturally (reifen ‘to ripen’,
schmelzen ‘to melt’, gären ‘to ferment’), or to events that constitute move-
ments like rollen ‘to roll’, segeln ‘to sail’, or fliegen ‘to fly’:
(21)der Zweig biegt sich / *der Zweig biegt ‘the twig bends’
(22)*der Zweig bricht sich / der Zweig bricht ‘the twig breaks’
3  Describing the Data: A Lexical Event Structure Approach
The descriptive value of a lexical-semantic theory of verbs depends on the
extent to which it is able to map the distinctions in the syntactic and semantic
behavior of verbs onto distinctions in the lexical representations of these
verbs. Having this in mind, notice that popular lexical semantic theories like
thematic role approaches, decompositional theories or Pustejovsky-style
event structure theories do not represent the punctual-durative distinction
(see examples below).
With respect to data that cover the breadth of phenomena relevant to
lexical semantics, it has been argued in Engelberg (1998) that a lexical event
structure theory of a certain type is needed to describe and explain these
phenomena. According to this lexical event structure (LES) theory, the
meaning of a verb is to be represented as an event structure which has the
following characteristics:
i) Complexity of events: Verbs refer to events that are internally structured
in the sense that they consist of different subevents (e1, e2, ..., en) and a
possible result state (s).
ii) Sorts of subevents: Subevents are durative (eDUR) or punctual (ePCT).
iii) Relations between subevents: Subevents are causally and temporally
related; a subevent can, e.g., precede another subevent (<), or subevents
can be temporally parallel (<>).
iv) Participation in subevents: The event participants which correspond to
the verb arguments are not necessarily involved in all subevents, but
rather only in some of them; participants and subevents are related by
semantic relations like ‘control’, ‘move’, ‘volition’, etc., out of which
thematic relations can be computed.
v) Implication vs. presupposition: The occurrence of a subevent can be
entailed (==>I) or presupposed (==>P) by the verb’s meaning.
A verb like to dry off as in Ron dried off the table is represented in a
thematic role approach as in (23) and in a decompositional approach (e.g.,
Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1996) as in (24), which also contains an
additional sorted event argument e that is assumed in some decompositional
theories (e.g., Wunderlich 1996). In Pustejovsky-style event structure
theories the representation is as in (25) in which the event in the event struc-
ture ES is represented as consisting of a process and a state. Decompositional
propositions are related to each subevent in an LCS’ structure out of which a
familiar cause-become decomposition (LCS) can be constructed (Pustejovsky
1991).
The representation of to dry off in the above described LES theory, as
developed in Engelberg (1998), is shown in (26). It says that to dry off
implies that the event it refers to consists of two subevents e1 and e2 and a
result state s. The first durative subevent (e.g., Ron’s wiping the table),
involving a controller (agent) and a theme is temporally parallel to the sec-
ond durative subevent (the becoming dry of the table) which is followed by a
result state (the table being dry)4:
(23)dry off: x = Agent, y = Theme
(24)dry off: (CAUSE (x, BECOME(DRY (y)))) (eTRANSITION)
(25)dry off: ES: [[Process] [State] ]Transition
LCS’ [[act(x,y) & ¬dry(y)] [dry(y)] ]
LCS cause(act(x,y), become(dry(y))
(26)dry off: (==>I e1-DUR: xControl, yTheme) <>
(==>I e2-DUR: yTheme) < (==>I s: yTheme)
To what extent this theory is able to adequately map distinctions in the
behavior of verbs onto lexical representations depends of course on what
kinds of syntactic or semantic phenomena are considered to be relevant for
lexical semantics at all. According to my understanding the objective of a
lexical semantic theory is to support explanations for at least the following
four types of phenomena. To illustrate each objective, the data described in
section 2 will be revisited, and it will be shown how the relevant meaning
distinctions are represented in the LES format.
i) Semantics-syntax mapping: The theory should explain the relations
between semantic argument structures and their corresponding syntactic
structures (‘linking’). Example: The valence alternation between an
accusative object and an an-construction is restricted to durative verbs
followed by a result state as is represented in the partial event structure5
in (27).
ii) Grammatical-categorial restrictions: The theory should account for the
(non-)occurrence of lexical items in certain grammatical categories.
Example: The restriction of the progressive to those punctual verbs that
                                                          
4The representation in (26) is an abbreviated form of a meaning postulate in a
type-driven predicate logic with a lambda operator, the framework in which the LES
theory has been elaborated in Engelberg (1998).
5The LES in (27) - (30) is partial in the sense that verb specific information that
does not influence the restrictions is omitted, which is indicated by "...".
either do not involve a result state or that presuppose a preceding event
involves verbs with an event structure as in (28) and (29).
iii) Co-occurrence restrictions: The theory should express selectional
restrictions. Example: PPs of the type in two hours are typically com-
bined with verbs with an event structure as in (30).
iv) Interpretation restrictions: The theory should represent systematic
restrictions concerning the interpretation of certain classes of lexical
items. Example: The iterative interpretation in the progressive aspect
involves verbs with the LES in (28).
(27) ... (==>I en-DUR: xAgent, yTheme) ... < (==>I s: yTheme)
(28) (==>I en-PCT: ...)
(29) (==>P e1-DUR: ...) < (==>I e2-PCT: ...) < (==>I s: ...)
(30) ... (==>I en-DUR: ..., y) < (==>I s: y)
The last two sections have shown that the punctual-durative distinction
plays a central role in lexical semantics since it involves all four types of
phenomena. Furthermore, I have demonstrated that the lexical origin of the
phenomena discussed can in principle be accounted for in the framework
presented.
4  Explaining the Data: The Meaning of ‘Punctuality’
I have argued elsewhere (Engelberg 1998, 1999) that although most lexical
semantic theories are more or less successful in mapping distinctions in the
semantic and syntactic behavior of verbs onto distinct structures in lexical
representations, these theories do not put much effort into clarifying the
semantics of these structures. The meaning representations are often
semantically extremely vague, with the result that the syntactic and semantic
phenomena to be explained tend to shape the representations in a circular
way, thereby yielding empirically weak theories.
To obtain meaning representations that can be examined independently
of the phenomena they are supposed to explain three types of clarifications
have to be obtained. Firstly, the logical type of the predicates used in the
representations has to be determined, e.g., if ‘AGENT’ is a function or a
relation between thing and event individuals, or between predicates and
argument positions, etc., and if ‘PUNCTUAL’ is a first-order property of
events or a second-order property of verbal predicates. Secondly, the truth
conditions of these predicates have to be worked out more clearly than has
been done so far in most lexical semantic theories. Finally, by developing
identity criteria for the basic ontological sorts of individual variables it has to
be shown what these variables stand for, i.e., it must be clear what, for
example, the event variable e represents. In the following, I will pursue the
first two questions with respect to the predicate ‘PUNCTUAL’.
There have been only very few approaches which, like Vendler (1957),
relate the class of expressions which are called ‘punctual’ in this paper to the
notion of an ‘instant’ in temporal logic. Vendler (1957:157) writes about
achievements like win the race6:
”A won a race between t1 and t2, means that the time instant at
which A won that race is between t1 and t2.”
While this might be justified for the few examples given by Vendler, it
seems that most ‘punctual’ events (as expressed in to break, to jump, to blast,
to knock, etc.) have a certain duration. This has been noticed by most
researchers before and after Vendler, too, beginning with Herling
(1840:107), Pott (1859:178), Goodwin (1889:16f), and others. Sarauw
(1905:147) observes:
“Since a shot lasts for a moment, it does take up some time, that is
to say, the beginning and the end do not coincide: the shot is not a
point in the sense of mathematics, but a point as it stands on a sheet
of paper, a point with a certain extension.”7
What is then the meaning of the predicate ‘punctual’ if it does not refer
to an instant or an instantaneous event in the sense of temporal logic? A
claim often made is that an event can simply be linguistically presented as
having no duration, or some hint is made at a cognitive device for conceiving
of events as punctual even if they are not.
                                                          
6The only elaborated approach to ‘instantaneous’ events I’m aware of is Piñon
(1997). Introducing boundaries in the basic ontology he can formalize the seemingly
contradictory idea, that an event, i.e., an entity that involves a change, can occur at an
instant.
7My translation of: "Der schuss dauert einen moment, also dauert er, also fallen
anfang und ende nicht ganz zusammen: der schuss ist kein punkt im sinne der
mathematik, sondern ein punkt wie er auf dem papier steht, mit einer gewissen
ausdehnung."
An early example is Curtius (1863), who like many other researchers of
that time develops a distinction between punctuality and durativity with the
aim of capturing the distinction between perfective and imperfective verb
stems in classical Greek. His notion of punctuality involves, like many
others, a spatial analogy:
“The expression ‘point of time’ is familiar. It is this notion I’m
taking up when I say that the action of the aorist can be compared to
a p o i n t . A point has no extension, and surely no less can be said
of the action expressed by the aorist, whose temporal extension is
left out of consideration. Actions expressed by speakers as simply
occurring [i.e., which are referred to by aorist forms] appear as
points to the spectator, just as objects that are far away or receding
into the background do, despite their factual extension in space.”8
(Curtius 1863:174)
An early example of an explanation which postulates an ability to
conceive of events as punctual can be found in Pott (1859), who treats
aspectual pairs and verb pairs related by aktionsart differences on a par and
therefore makes punctuality a lexical distinction. He claims that with verb
pairs in Slavic and pairs in German like sitzen ‘to sit’ / sich setzen ‘to sit
down’ one can discover “[...] that in these pairs reference to the same kind of
temporal property is made, which involves - to illustrate the matter briefly
and aptly by borrowing a spatial metaphor - whether they are thought of as
being p u n c t u a l  in their duration (which, of course, is impossible in the
strongest mathematical sense and therefore only relatively true) or being
l i n e a r ” (Pott 1859:178).9
                                                          
8My translation of: "Der Ausdruck Zeitpunkt ist geläufig. An ihn knüpfe ich an,
wenn ich sage, dass die Handlung des Aorists einem P u n k t e  verglichen werden
könne. Dem Punkte kommt bekanntlich gar keine Ausdehnung zu, ebenso wenig
kommt bei der durch den Aorist bezeichneten Handlung ihre zeitliche Erstreckung in
Betracht. Und wie entfernte oder in den Hintergrund tretende Gegenstände, trotz
ihrer factischen Ausdehnung im Raume, doch als Punkte erscheinen, so auch vom
sprechenden die Handlungen, die er eben nur als eintretende aufführt."
9My translation of: "[...] in beiden Rücksichtnahme auf eine gleiche Eigenschaft
der Zeit, nämlich danach, ob sie - um die Sache durch ein vom Raume entlehntes
Bild in Kürze und schlagend zu veranschaulichen - ihrer Dauer nach
A more poetic variant of this kind of semantics we owe to Gildersleeve
(1902:251):
“Tense of duration, tense of momentum, would not be so
objectionable, but, unfortunately, duration has to be explained and
the seat of the duration put where it belongs, in the eye of the
beholder, in the heart of the sympathizer, and not in the action itself.
Describe a rapid action and you have the imperfect. Sum up a long
action and you have the aorist.”
Interestingly, more recent and partly formalized approaches to
aspectuality do not differ very much from the older definitions. Platzack
(1979:93) claims that punctual verbs refer to events “that do not last in time
(or rather, are not conceived of as lasting in time)” and Moens (1987:102)
states:
“[...] processes and culminated processes can be »compressed« into
points. This [...] does not mean that they cease to have a temporal
duration, but rather that their internal structure is no longer of
importance.”
While the claim that ‘punctual’ verbs refer to logical instants is not
justified by the reference of most of these verbs, the assumption that we
conceive of events as being punctual or that punctuality is a property of verbs
does not make much sense either. Concrete events involve a change over
time, i.e., duration is an essential property of these events.10 What it is that
we are in fact doing in conceiving of events as having no duration is not
conceiving of them as events anymore. It is for this reason that attempts to
clarify the meaning of the notion of ‘punctuality’ have not been very
satisfying so far.
At first sight, it seems surprising anyways that languages distinguish
between verbs that refer to short events and those that refer to longer events.
Most other central concepts in lexical semantics like ‘cause’, ‘agent’ or ‘will’
play a central role in our overall cognitive architecture. I will present
evidence that this holds for the durative-punctual distinction, too. A look at
                                                                                                                           
p u n k t u e l l  gedacht wird (was freilich in strengster mathematischer Strenge
unmöglich und demnach nur beziehungsweise wahr), oder l i n e a r ."
10Cf. Engelberg (1998:216ff) for an extensive discussion on event ontology.
the research on cognitive time concepts reveals that a short interval of 2 to 3
seconds plays a crucial role for perception, behavior, and speech production.
The following phenomena involve this three-second interval which I will
refer to as the ‘cognitive moment’11:
i) Errors in the estimation of the length of intervals: Experiments show that
the length of short acoustic or visual stimuli is overestimated while the
length of long stimuli is underestimated; the threshold between over- and
underestimation lies between 2 and 2.5 seconds (Pöppel 1978).
ii) Oscillation of extremely faint sounds: Faint, barely audible acoustic
stimuli like the ticking of a watch held some distance from the ear are
only perceived periodically; the rhythmic appearance and disappearence
of the sound perception occurs every couple of seconds (Urbantschitsch
1875).
iii) Rhythm of metronome beats: Regular metronome beats of equal acoustic
quality are perceived as units of two (or more); this “tick-tock” effect
disappears if the distance between two beats exceeds about 2.5 seconds
(Wundt 1911).
iv) Oscillation of ambivalent patterns: The perception of ambivalent
patterns like the Necker cube below oscillates between the two readings
of the pattern at least every three seconds or so; to a large degree this
occurs independently of the will of the observer (Pöppel 1985).
v) Distance between pauses in speech production: Crosslinguistic
investigations of spoken lyrics show a tendency towards rhythms with
short pauses about every 3 seconds (Turner and Pöppel 1985).
Comparable rhythms can be found in normal speech (Pöppel 1985). It
                                                          
11For a more thorough presentation and discussion of the following phenomena,
cf. Engelberg (1999).
has independently been noticed that rhythmic pauses in speech are not
explained by the demands of breathing rhythms (Handel 1989).
vi) Rhythm of actions: Intercultural investigations show that simple actions
like scratching, hand-shaking, knocking, chopping a tree, waving, or
hammering tend to be bundled into rhythmic groups with a length of two
to three seconds, interrupted by short breaks (Feldhütter, Schleidt and
Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1990).
The cognitive moment or “subjective present” as this interval has been
called is determined by a neural mechanism that integrates successive events
into a perceptual gestalt whose duration is restricted to an upper limit of
about three seconds (Pöppel 1985:53). This gestalt creates something like a
“window of consciousness” that induces a “feeling of nowness”. Since the
perception of events and the structure of our own actions is determined by
the cognitve moment, it can be assumed that our general cognitive concept of
events involves a classification of events that is mirrored in the way we use
verbs to talk about events: punctual events are events that don’t take longer
than the time of the cognitive moment while durative events exceed this
three-second interval.
Since the proposed conception of punctuality is based largely on our
perceptual system, it relates to relatively simple, concrete events. The basic
readings of verbs can be defined as those readings in which reference is made
to events that are immediately available perceptually, as for example in (31).
But metaphorical readings often involve reference to more abstract events in
which the temporal structure of the basic reading is not completely preserved
as in (32) which we can hardly call ‘punctual’ in the sense that it refers to an
interval shorter than three seconds. Nevertheless, in both readings the
accusative object cannot be replaced by the an-construction showing that the
basic reading of the verb determines its behavior.12
(31)sie spaltete das Brett / *an dem Brett
‘she split the board / was splitting the board’
(32)sie spaltete die Partei / *an der Partei
‘she divided (“split”) the party / was dividing the party’
Thus, finally, if we want to conceive of ‘punctuality’ as a second-order
property we can call those verbs punctual that refer to punctual events in
their basic reading.
                                                          
12Cf. for a more detailed discussion Engelberg (1999).
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